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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
KASEY BURGESS-BEYNON, ] 
Defendant and Appellant. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
) Case No. 20030454-CA 
1 Priority No. 2 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT. 
This is an appeal of the trial court's failure to quash a bind-over. In this 
matter, the trial court broadened the definition of "place of confinement" to include a 
police vehicle in comparison to a jail, prison or other facility. In so doing, the court 
allowed the State to move the case forward on a felony "destruction of jail property" in 
stead of a misdemeanor criminal mischief when the defendant broke the arresting 
officer's squad car window after being placed in arrest. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION, 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953, 
as amended) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony). Kasey Beynon appeals the 
final order and judgment of the Second Judicial District Court, in and for Davis County 
involving the inappropriately broadened interpretation of the Damage to Jail Statute, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). (R. at 128, 132). This matter is on 
appeal pursuant to State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935, 938-39 (Utah Ct App. 1997).1 The 
Sentence is (Appendix A); the Order denying motion to quash is (Appendix B). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, 
(1) Whether the trial court properly interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 
(1953, as amended) to include a police vehicle? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
Statutory interpretation presents a question of law. Ward v. Richfield City, 
798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). "Matters of statutory construction are questions of law 
that are reviewed for correctness." State v. State. 57 P.3d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 2002). 
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 12. Utah State Const. Art. I, § 8. 
1
 In Sery, the Utah Court of Appeals recognized the validity of a conditional guilty 
plea. 
2 
Utah State Const. Art. I, § 7. Utah State Const. Art. I, § 24. 
State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) 
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) 
STATEMENTS OF THE CASE, 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from Ms. Beynon's motion to quash bindover, where Judge 
Kay denied her motion claiming that pursuant to Section 76-8-418 a police cruiser is 
within the meaning of "other place of confinement." The court declared that 
"confinement" goes beyond just a physical building, and the focus is on the status of the 
defendant, not on the place where defendant is being confined. (R. at 128; R at 138, p. at 
11). (App. B). 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
Ms. Beynon was charged with Damaging a Jail, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). (R. at 1). The State alleged and are stipulated to 
by defendant that 
"On January 31, 2002, a vehicle being driven by defendant was stopped for a 
traffic violation. When the officers made contact with defendant, they detected an 
odor of alcohol coming from defendant's person. Defendant was asked to 
perform several field sobriety tests . Based on those test, it was determined that 
defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent that defendant could not 
safely operate a vehicle. 
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Defendant was taken into custody and placed in the officer's vehicle. Defendant 
then became angry and kicked out the rear window of the patrol car. 
(R. at 2-3). 
On or about May 1, 2002, after a preliminary hearing, the Honorable Rodney S. 
Page bound over the defendant. (R. at 40). Based upon the bind over, the defendant 
filed a motion to quash bindover or to dismiss the felony count on June 21, 2002. (R. at 
49-55); (App. C). The State filed its memorandum in opposition on June 25, 2002. (R. 
at 56-59). (App. D). On July 18, 2002, the Honorable Thomas L. Kay heard oral 
arguments concerning the meaning of confinement. At the conclusion, the judge 
rendered his decision. (R. at 138). (App. E). 
Afterwards, on March 6, 2003, the parties entered into a Sery plea. (R. at 123). 
And on April 17, 2003, the Court accepted Ms. Beynon's plea and sentenced her, staying 
the payment of her fine pending the appeal. (R. at 131-32). On that same date, the Court 
signed an order denying motion to quash bindover. (R. at 128); (App. B). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
No trial was conducted. On April 17, 2003, the Court sentenced the 
defendant on the terms of her Sery conditional plea to have this Court review the trial 
court's decision denying the defendant's motion to quash bindover. 
IV. Statements of Fact: 
In this matter, the facts are not disputed between the parties. The facts are: 
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On January 31, 2002, a vehicle being driven by defendant was stopped for a 
traffic violation. When the officers made contact with defendant, they detected an 
odor of alcohol coming from defendant's person. Defendant was asked to 
perform several field sobriety tests . Based on those test, it was determined that 
defendant was under the influence of alcohol to an extent that defendant could not 
safely operate a vehicle. 
Defendant was taken into custody and placed in the officer's vehicle. Defendant 
then became angry and kicked out the rear window of the patrol car. 
(R. at 2-3). 
The defendant contends that her breaking the rear window of the police 
cruiser was not felonious because it was not a place of confinement as used in Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-418. Rather, she urges this Court to follow precedent authority and 
conclude that Ms. Beynon conducted herself disorderly and committed an act of criminal 
mischief by damaging the property of another. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
At hand is the "'injury to a jail' statute" as this Court called it in State v. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, Ms. Beynon admits breaking 
the rear window of a police cruiser. But she contends that breaking a window of a polcie 
vehicle is not the same as damaging a jail. The trial court was wrong for construing her 
conduct to be in violation of Section 76-8-418. 
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ARGUMENTS 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO FOLLOW STARE DECISIS AND 
INAPPROPRIATELY CONCLUDED THAT A JAIL WAS DAMAGED. 
In this matter, Ms. Beynon challenges the trial court's interpretation of the 
Injury To A Jail statute, Section 76-8-418. The question presented is a question of law 
upon undisputed facts pursuant to a Sery conditional plea. Since no deference is 
considered on appeal, Ms. Beynon's appeal is de novo and the arguments are reraised in 
toto. "Matters of statutory construction are questions of law that are reviewed for 
correctness." State v. State. 57 P.3d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 2002); see also, Ward v. 
Richfield City. 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990). 
POINT. MS, BEYNON DID NOT VIOLATE SECTION 76-8-418: SHE DID NOT 
CAUSE INJURY TO A JAIL FACILITY. 
The injury to a jail statute provides, "A person who willfully and 
intentionally breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public 
jail or other place of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-418 (2002). This Court calls this statute the "'injury to a jail' statute." State 
v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, the defendant was 
wrongfully charged with committing this offense on the claim that she damaged a police 
vehicle alone. (R. at 2-3). The claim is not that she damaged a public jail. The 
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allegation is a stretch-the State prefers this Court to believe that a police vehicle is 
somehow to be construed as fitting within the Legislature's intended meaning of "other 
place of confinement." 
In reviewing the facts of this case, defendant directs this Court to Section 
76-5-101 which defines a "Prisoner." There are two situations where one is considered a 
"prisoner": (1) when any person is in custody of a peace officer pursuant to a lawful 
arrest and (2) when he is confined in a jail or other penal institution or a facility used for 
confinement of delinquent juveniles operated by the Division of Youth Corrections 
regardless of whether the confinement is legal. 
In this matter, Defendant was a prisoner of police officers when she was 
arrested for DUI and placed into police vehicle. (R. at 2-3). In this matter, Ms. Beynon 
was not a confined person of a jail, prison, or other penal institution or facility used for 
the confinement of juvenile delinquents. When Ms. Beynon damaged the rear window 
of the police cruiser she was only the prisoner of the arresting officer. (R. at 2-3). 
The facts of this case stretch the rulings of past decisions of this Court. 
In State v. Jairnez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),2 this Court held that the squad 
room of the jail was within the meaning of "jail" and it interpreted that "any damage to 
the facility" within the plain meaning of "injury" was punishable under Section 76-8-
418. IcL, at 827; see also, State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). In Perez, 
2
 Jaimez interpreted the injury to jail statute. 
7 
the Court of Appeals specifically rejected using the doctrine of ejusdem generis to 
interpret the injury to a jail statute when the statute does not appear to be vague or 
uncertain noting that the doctrine "was 'developed to aid in determining the intent of 
legislation where meaning is obscure or uncertain.'" Id.; see also, Great Salt Lake Auth. 
v. Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (1966). 
In light of Jaimez and Perez, in this matter the injury to a jail statute is quite 
clear. The legislature did not intend to include a vehicle as a place of confinement within 
the context of Section 76-8-418. Jails, prisons and the like are intended to be places of 
confinement once an accused person is committed as an inmate. See, Jaimez at 883. A 
police vehicle is intended to be used for the transportation of arrested persons, not 
confinement of committed inmates. Accord, Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 
1990) (opined that an arrest and detention in a parole office did not constitute 
confinement). 
With this information known to the trial court judge, the defendant's 
motion to quash should have been granted. The defendant did not cause damage to a jail, 
prison or other penal institution. 
CONCLUSION 
Ms. Beynon has been unjustly charged in this matter. Ms. Beynon's 
criminal mischievousness should never have been enhanced to a felony conduct. In this 
matter, it would be just and proper for this Court to overturn the felony conviction and 
8 
remand the matter under directions to enter the conviction as a misdemeanor criminal 
mischief or disorderly conduct offense. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _T_ day of 
February, 2004. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I, D. Bruce Oliver, hereby certify that on this 7th day of February, 2004, 
I served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT upon the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter to the following address: Matthew Bates, Office of the Attorney 
General, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
^ . ^ L ^ J ^ 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Appendix "A" 
- Sentence -
2nd District - Farmington Dept COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KASEY LYNN BURGESS-BEYNON, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Own Recognizance 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
NOTICE 
Case No: 021700156 FS 
Judge: THOMAS L. KAY 
Date: April 17, 2003 
PRESENT 
Clerk: vickil 
Prosecutor: PETERSON, CRAIG T 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): OLIVER, D BRUCE 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 2, 1972 
Video 
Tape Number: F 127 Tape Count: 125 
CHARGES 
1. DAMAGE JAILS - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 03/06/2003 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DAMAGE JAILS a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
Page 1 
JUDGEMENT ENTERED 
D A T E J i ^ l ^ 
TIME. 
Case No: 021700156 
Date: Apr 17, 2003 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine 
Suspended 
Surcharge 
Due 
$1000.00 
$0 .00 
$459.46 
$1000.00 
Total Fine 
Total Suspended 
Total Surcharge 
Total Principal Due 
$1000.00 
$0 
$459.46 
$1000.00 
Plus Interest 
Fine payments are to be made to Adult Probation and Court 
SENTENCE FINE PAYMENT NOTE 
The fine is on stay pending appeal 
COMMUNITY SERVICE 
Complete 8 0 hour(s) of community service. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Restitution: Amount: $767.40 Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 6 month(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1000.00 which includes the surcharge 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
Page 2 
Case No: 021700156 
Date: Apr 17, 2003 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
ALCOHOL: Do not use or possess alcoholic beverages or frequent 
places where alcohol is the chief item for sale. 
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in the 
presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled 
substances. 
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program, 
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle 
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request 
of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable cause. 
EMPLOYMENT: Obtain and maintain lawful, verifiable, full time 
employment. 
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or 
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement. 
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee. 
^ 
Dated this ^ M day of hi 
<{h>& 
THOMAS L. KAY/ 
District CoWt Judge 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Ali Holmes at 
801-447-3818 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. 
The general information phone number is 801-447-3800. 
-K'>,""'/> ****** -" / 
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Appendix "B" 
- Order Denying Motion To Quash -
Craig T. Peterson, #7095 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
FarmingtonUT 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
FAX: (801)451-4328 
APR 1 ? 2X2 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO QUASH BINDOVER OR 
TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT 
Case No. 021700156 
Judge: Thomas L. Kay 
This matter came before the Court on July 18, 2002, for hearing on Defendant's "Motion 
to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss Felony Count." Present were: Kasey L. Burgess-Beynon, 
Defendant; D. Bruce Oliver, Counsel for Defendant; and, Michael S. Edwards, Counsel for the 
State. The primary issue before the Court being whether or not the police cruiser in which the 
defendant was detained qualifies as a "public jail or other place of confinement," under Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-418. 
Having heard the arguments of counsel, and having reviewed the exhibits, case law, and 
statutory law, the court finds this is a matter of first impression. Further, the Court finds that the 
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-418, specifically "or other place of confinement," 
indicates that the section shall apply to more than just jails. The definition of "confinement" 
goes beyond just a physical building, and the focus is on the status of the defendant, not on the 
place where defendant is being confined. Therefore, the police cruiser in which the defendant 
was being detained after arrest qualifies as a "place of confinement" under the statute. 
The motion of defendant is denied. 
DATED April 17, 2003. 
THOMAS L, 
Judge 
Appendix "C" 
- Motion To Quash Bindover -
D. Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MB 
j 
tayton D/sinci c 
oourt 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
OR TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT 
Case No. 021700156 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Defendant, Kasey Burgess-Beynon, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby moves this Honorable Court for an order quashing the former bindover of the 
felony count (Count I) Damaging a Jail, Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as amended). In 
the alternative, for a dismissal of said count. The basis for this motion is that Defendant at no 
time has caused any injury to a jail or other facility1 within the Legislature's meaning of a 
"place of confinement." 
The defendant relies on the cases Stale v Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991): 
State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); and State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2000). 
This motion is filed pursuant to the Exclusionary Rule, and is supported by 
Section 76-8-418 of the Utah Code, Article I, Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 24 of the Utah 
Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Said motion 
is further supported by the accompanying memorandum, which is incorporated herein and 
annexed hereto by this reference.2 
In this matter, the defendant is likely to prevail on the merits of this case and 
said motion is in no way adverse to the public interest. Moreover, the people's interests in 
preserving the rights, privileges and immunities claimed in this matter outweigh the 
governments' claim to prosecute. 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2002. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
The Defense reserves the right to supplement briefing after a hearing on this issue. 
z 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION, 
postage prepaid, to: Mel Wilson, Davis County Attorney's Office, 800 West State Street, P.O. 
Box 618, Farmington, Utah 84025. 
Dated this 20th day of June, 2002. 
fj^hJrWj^, 
3 
D.Bruce Oliver #5120 
Attorney for Defendant 
180 South 300 West, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490 
Telephone: (801) 328-8888 
Fax: (801) 595-0300 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FILED 
Layton District Court 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER 
OR TO DISMISS FELONY COUNT 
Case No. 021700156 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
Defendant, Kasey Burgess-Beynon, by and through counsel, D. Bruce Oliver, 
and hereby SUBMITS this memorandum of points and authorities in support of her Motion To 
Quash Bindover. 
PREFACE. 
Article 1 Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution reads: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in 
whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause 
or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
POINT. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT RELIABLE HEARSAY THAT 
DEFENDANT INJURED A JAIL FACILITY. 
The injury to a jail statute provides: "A person who willfully and intentionally 
breaks down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place 
of confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-418 (1953, as 
amended). The Court of Appeals calls this statute the "'injury to a jail' statute." State v. 
Pharris, 846 P.2d 454 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In this matter, the defendant is being charged 
with this offense on the claim that she damaged a police vehicle. The claim is not that she 
damaged a public jail. The allegation is a stretch-the State prefers this Court to believe that a 
police vehicle is somehow to be construed as fitting within The Legislature's intended meaning 
of "other place of confinement." 
The Court of Appeals stated in State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991)1 that the statutory language includes "any damage to the facility" within the plain 
meaning of "injury." Id., at 827; State v. Perez, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
1
 Jaimez interpreted the injury to jail statute. 
2 
In Perez, the Court of Appeals specifically rejected using the doctrine of 
ejusdem generis to interpret the injury to a jail statute when the statute does not appear to be 
vague or uncertain noting that the doctrine "was 'developed to aid in determining the intent of 
legislation where meaning is obscure or uncertain.'" Id.; see also, Great Salt Lake Auth. v. 
Island Ranching Co., 18 Utah 2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, 966 (1966). 
In this matter, the injury to a jail statute is quite clear. The legislature did not 
intend to include a vehicle as a place of confinement within the context of Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-418. Jails, prisons and the like are intended to be places of confinement once an accused 
person is committed as an inmate. See, Jaimez at 883. A police vehicle is intended to be used 
for the transportation of arrested persons, not confinement of committed inmates. Accord, 
Clark v. Poulton, 914 F.2d 1426 (10th Cir. 1990) (opined that an arrest and detention in a 
parole office did not constitute confinement). 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Defendant respectfully requests this court to quash 
the bind-over, or in the alternative, to dismiss the felony count (regarding U.C.A. § 76-8-418 
(1953, as amended). 
DATED this 20th day of June, 2002. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM, postage prepaid, to: Mel Wilson, Davis County Attorney's Office, 800 
West State Street, P.O. Box 618, Farmington, Utah 84025. 
Dated this 20th day of June, 2002. 
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Appendix "D" 
- Memorandum In Opposition To Motion -
Michael S. Edwards, #8571 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KASEY L. BURGESS-BEYNON 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO QUASH 
BINDOVER OR TO DISMISS FELONY 
COUNT 
Case No. 021700156 
Judge: Thomas L. Kay 
The State of Utah, through Michael S. Edwards, Deputy Davis County Attorney, hereby 
submits its Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss 
Felony Count. The basis for the State's opposition is that the plain wording of the statute in 
question is broad enough to encompass damage to a police car, where the defendant is being 
detained in the police car after her arrest. 
ARGUMENT 
As the Court is aware, the allegation against the defendant, on Count One of the State's 
Information, is that she is guilty of "Damaging a Jail," because she kicked one of the windows 
out of a police car, after she was arrested, handcuffed and confined in the vehicle by Officer 
Cody Olsen. The defendant's memorandum alleges that the State did not provide "reliable 
hearsay that defendant injured a jail facility." The defendant is correct, the State did not rely on 
reliable hearsay in any way at the preliminary hearing of this case. What was presented was the 
1 
WL A 'M VW 
r O U" t»q 
testimony of two officers who were involved in the defendant's arrest, who were present on the 
scene, heard the window shatter and observed the broken glass around the police car. Officers 
Olsen and Adams both testified to these facts, and further testified that there were no other 
persons in, on or about the police car when the window was shattered. They deduced from these 
facts that the defendant is the person who broke the car window. So the defendant is correct, the 
State did not present reliable hearsay, it presented direct testimony of witnesses on the scene. 
The defendant urges the Court to interpret the "Damaging Jails"1 statute narrowly, such 
that, as a matter of law, the statute only covers damage done to "[j]ails, prisons and the like." 
The State simply asks the Court to apply the plain language of the statute to determine whether it 
would include the conduct committed by the defendant in this case. See State v. Jaimez, 817 
P.2d 822, 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) and Utah Code Annotated §76-1-106. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-6-418 states: "A person who willfully and intentionally breaks 
down, pulls down, destroys, floods, or otherwise damages any public jail or other place of 
confinement is guilty of a felony of the third degree." (emphasis added). There is no question in 
this case that the defendant damaged the police car after she had been arrested, placed in 
handcuffs and confined inside the car. The only issue the Court must decide is: whether a police 
car with a handcuffed arrestee confined inside it is an "other place of confinement." If it is, there 
is probable cause that the defendant has violated Utah Code Annotated §76-8-418, and the 
defendant's motion must be denied. For the following reasons, the State asks the Court to find 
that a police car is an "other place of confinement." 
The plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature meant this section to apply 
to more than just jails. If the legislature only intended this "Damaging Jails" section to apply to 
1
 Utah Code Annotated § 76-8-418. 
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jails and prisons, they would have worded the section to reflect that narrow intent. The very 
words "or other place of confinement" indicate that the legislature intended to make it a felony 
for a person in custody to damage the place they are being confined in, regardless of the specific 
label attached to that "place of confinement." Where, as here, the defendant is confined in a 
police car, pending transportation to the jail, the police car is as much a "place of confinement" 
as is the jail. It is a place where the defendant is being held against her will, until the charges 
against her are adjudicated. The plain wording of the statute should be read to include police 
cars, in circumstances such as this. 
The Court can also look to statutory definitions for help in determining what the 
legislature meant when it said "or other place of confinement." The legislature did not define 
"place of confinement" in Utah Code Annotated §76-8-418, or anywhere else in part four of Title 
76, Chapter Eight. However, "confinement" is defined in Utah Code Annotated §76-8-
309(7)(a)2 as follows: 
"Confinement" means the prisoner is: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility pursuant to a contract with the 
Utah Department of Corrections after being sentenced and committed and 
the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on 
parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial or sentencing or housed in a 
county jail after sentencing and commitment and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
Under the definition of "confinement" used in this statute, the defendant was in a place of 
confinement, because she was being lawfully detained following her arrest. The Court should 
consider this as it works to determine whether a police car is a "place of confinement," though 
this definition is not specifically applied to the statutory section we are analyzing. 
Utah Code Annotated §76-8-309 is the "Escape and Aggravated Escape" section. 
3 
Also instructive on this issue is the definition of "confinement" in Black's Law 
Dictionary. The Sixth Edition defines "confinement" as: "State of being confined; shut in; 
imprisoned; detention in penal institution. Confinement may be by either a moral or a physical 
restraint, by threats of violence with a present force, or by physical restraint of the person." 
Applying this definition to the case at hand, where the defendant was placed in handcuffs in a 
police car after arrest, the police car was used to confine (i.e. shut in) the defendant, by physical 
restraint of her person. Thus, by force of logic and common sense, the police car was a "place of 
confinement," and the Court should so rule. 
The defendant cites State v. Jaimez? and State v. Perez,4 to support her argument. 
However, these cases are not on point. The issue in Jaimez was whether or not a certain room in 
the jail fell within the wording of the statute. This clearly does not answer the question presently 
before the court. The issue in Perez was whether certain damage to a jail cell was sufficient to 
fall within the statute's prohibition. Once again, this does not assist the Court in deciding the 
issue at hand. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and arguments, the State respectfully asks the Court to 
deny the defendant's motion. 
DATED June 24, 2002. 
Michael S. Edwards 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
J
 817 P.2d 822 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
4
 200 U T App 65, 999 P.2d 579 (Utah Ct. App. 2000). 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
I certify that I faxed an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Quash Bindover or to Dismiss Felony Count to D. Bruce 
Oliver, Attorney for Defendant, (801) 595-0300 on June 24, 2002. 
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1 FARMINGTON, UTAH; FRIDAY, JULY 18, 2002 
2 HONORABLE THOMAS L. KAY, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: The last matter now is State of Utah vs. 
5 Kasey Lynn Burgess-Beynon. Mr. Oliver, we just took the 
6 not-guilty plea of the other Mr. Oliver and set this for a 
7 pretrial on September 5th at 1:00 p.m. 
8 MR. OLIVER: Good afternoon, Your Honor, I apologize. 
9 I had a hearing at 1:45 in Salt Lake that was supposed to be a 
10 half an hour, and Commissioner Casey just, I just barely got 
11 out and I apologize. I really apologize for being late. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. Well, does the September 5th date 
13 of 1:00 p.m. work for everyone? 
14 MR. OLIVER: Let me check real quick, Your Honor. 
15 MR. EDWARDS: All right for the State, your Honor. 
16 (inaudible). 
17 MR. OLIVER: Yeah. We need to get some additional 
18 police reports and so forth, Your Honor. Yes. Well, let's 
19 see. Yes, I think it will work. 
20 THE COURT: Okay. September 5th, then, Thursday at 
21 1:00 p.m. 
22 Okay. Now we're here on State of Utah vs. Kasey Lynn 
23 Burgess-Beynon, and this is the time set for a motion hearing. 
24 The motion is to quash the bind-over or to dismiss the felony 
25 count, and there's been a memorandum supporting the motion to 
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1 quash the bind-over and to dismiss the felony countr and then 
2 there's been a memorandum in opposition to that, and I've read 
3 all of those. 
4 MR. OLIVER: And, your Honor, may I approach? I just 
5 have a copy of an exhibit. 
6 THE COURT: Yes. 
7 MR. OLIVER: What this is, your Honor, is just a list 
8 of the statutory provisions that we reference. 
9 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 
10 MR. OLIVER: So that's all that is. There's nothing 
11 new with that. It's just a printed copy of the statutes that 
12 we reference. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. 
14 MR. OLIVER: There's one additional statute, your 
15 Honor, that I'd like to refer the Court to, and that's 76-8 and 
16 it's actually in connection with the one that the State 
17 responded to, and it's just going to take me one second to find 
18 it, but the 76-8-3 that he was talking about with regard to the 
19 definition of — in the escape. 
20 THE COURT: 76-8-3? 
21 MR. OLIVER: No. I didn't finish it off. 
22 MR. EDWARDS: Does it say dash 3 on 7(a) -
23 MR. OLIVER: And I was trying to grab my book, and I 
24 was stumbling through it. It's 76-8-309, and he's quoted the 
25 definition 7(a) and so forth. Now on this, the first thing I'd 
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1 like the Court to realize, and I think that Mr. Edwards does 
2 point it out in his memorandum, that this definition is for 
3 this part, and it starts off specifically "For purposes of this 
4 part," and then it gives a definition of confinement as it 
5 pertains to escape and aggravated escape. 
6 But I'd like to reference this particular section as 
7 an example of the very things that we've talked about 
8 previously or in my memorandum and the statutes that we've 
9 provided by way of example, and that's in (b), 7(b) where it 
10 says "Official Custody.'7 And it says: 
11 "Official custody means arrest, whether 
12 with or without a warrant, or confinement in 
13 a state prison, jail, institution for secure 
14 confinement of juvenile offenders, or any 
15 confinement purpose pursuant to an order of 
16 the court or sentenced and committed to the -
17 and the sentence has not been terminated 
18 or voided, or the prisoner is not on parole." 
19 A person is considered confined within the state if 
20 he — and I think that that last sentence — I've read that 
21 several times — goes on, and I'm not sure how that reads 
22 smoothly because it doesn't make sense as I read the following 
23 couple of paragraphs, because it talks about escaping, but it 
24 says a person is considered confined in the state prison if he, 
25 and then goes on. 
1 So what we have there, your Honor, is in the code 
2 referenced by the State, they have cited this definition of 
3 confinement, but then in (b) under 7 it goes on to state 
4 official custody means arrest, whether with or without a 
5 warrant, then says "or confinement/' and then goes on and 
6 defines more specifically what confinement is and talks about a 
7 facility under authority of the court and things of that 
8 nature. 
9 And it's our position that the statute is called 
10 damage to jails. It's referenced that way. As a matter of 
11 fact, when you look in the beginning, and I recognize the 
12 headings are not necessarily controlling, except case law also 
13 states it that way. But when you look at the beginning of 
14 Chapter 8, Offenses Against the Administration of Government, 
15 and when you down through, when you read in part 4, Offenses 
16 Against Public Property, and then it goes on down through, and 
17 when it comes to 76-8-418, it says damaging jails. 
18 So all of the concepts that I can find are covered by 
19 the fact that the damaging jails that is intended there has to 
20 do with physical facilities and secure confinement facilities 
21 as well, and so I think that as I had argued before and 
22 mentioned to the court, I think ejusdem generis, as I can see 
23 it, both in 76-8-418 and all of the other provisions, they 
24 suggest that indeed it is more than just being arrested and 
25 transported in a police car from the arrest scene. 
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1 Now, there's two last things that I want to point 
2 out. Let me just get the right citation here. In - let me 
3 just get the right citation here. In a 1992 case, 963 F.2d 
4 1361, it's Clark v. Polton. It's James Edward Clark v. Robert 
5 Poltonr Utah State Corrections Department, et al.r and this is 
6 a Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals case. And dealing with this 
7 in reality, the dissent, Judge Seymour in the dissent, actually 
8 embraces the thought put on by the State, where the majority 
9 opinion indicates that confinement has got to be met with 
10 certain — 
11 THE COURT: Well, what were the facts? What was 
12 being confined or the place of confinement in that case. 
13 MR. OLIVER: It was the state prison, and it was 
14 dealing with pretrial detention, things of that nature. And 
15 what the court — I'll be happy to give the Court a copy of the 
16 case. I've only have one, and I'll let you take a look at it. 
17 May I approach? 
18 THE COURT: Sure. 
19 MR. OLIVER: What the court ruled was that for 
20 confinement purposes that there must be due-process 
21 protections, and so they go through, and what they determine is 
22 ' that there is a difference between being in custody, being 
23 arrested, and how you're confined, and they indicate for 
24 confinement to be in effect that there must be due-process 
25 protections, and it's our position that that's what all of 
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1 these statutes that we have in the state of Utah indicates care 
2 confinement, places of confinement. Even home confinement is a 
3 place if after sentence. And so when a person is sentenced, 
4 they can be sentenced to home confinement. So these are the 
5 types of things that confinement suggests, as opposed to a 
6 police car when a person's first arrested. 
7 Now, that doesn't mean that a person can damage a 
8 police car and walk. I mean you have criminal mischief to 
9 cover that, and it is there to be covered. So the state does 
10 not go — or the city, as the case may be — does not go 
11 unprotected, and it does have a means of, A, charging and, B, 
12 recovering damages, as the case may be. A person can be held 
13 to be responsible for that, but the circumstances are that even 
14 in the 76-8-418, - excuse me, 76-8-418, sorry - where the — 
15 when the damaging jail statute was modified by the legislature, 
16 it also modified juvenile provisions and was very specific 
17 talking about secure confinement and talking about those types 
18 of provisions. 
19 And so it's our position that the word confinement in 
20 76-8-418 is exemplified by the examples, or is exemplified by 
21 the words contained within the statute, and then ejusdem 
22 generis goes on to show that indeed what we're talking about is 
23 physical facilities, secure confinement locations, jails, 
24 prisons, and things of that nature, where a person can be 
25 sentenced to as a result of court action. 
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1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
2 Mr. Edwards? 
3 MR. EDWARDS: Thanks, your Honor. 
4 Your Honor, first I'd like to refer the Court, as I 
5 did in my memorandum, to Section 76-1-106. I think that really 
6 provides the starting point to the Court for how each statute 
7 is to be interpreted. If the Court has that in front of itl'll 
8 just refer the Court to that in consideration as I make my 
9 argument, because I think the Court — that section and all the 
10 case law the Court's supposed to first give statutory section 
11 in plain wording. I think the Court can only grant defendant's 
12 motion if the Court finds that a place of confinement is a term 
13 of art that only means places like jails and prisons. 
14 And, your Honor, the fascinating thing for me, if 
15 that is the case, is the very wording of 76-6-418 names any 
16 public jail or other place of confinement. It doesn't go into 
17 detail and delineate each place that might qualify. And so, 
18 your Honor, I think the plain wording of that, as I argued in 
19 my memorandum, is that it can mean other places. 
20 Really the more appropriate focus is on the status of 
21 the defendant rather than on the label attached to the place 
22 where the defendant is. In other words, if a person is being 
23 confined, then the place where they are is a fact of a place of 
24 confinement, and if they cause damage to that place, they have 
25 violated Section 76-6-418. 
7 
1 It's interesting, your Honor, if you look at the — I 
2 just looked briefly at the statutory sections that Mr. Oliver 
3 has provided for us, and in the juvenile court amendments they 
4 didn't specifically define exactly what a place of confinement 
5 was to mean, although it did word it generally such as a place 
6 of confinement includes X and Y. It didn't say that that was 
7 necessarily a mutually exclusive list. It did spell it out a 
8 little better than this statute did. 
9 So, your Honor, that's the position of the State. 
10 Once again, I think all the other case law from our state has 
11 not been on point. This is, as far as I'm concerned, an issue 
12 of first impression before the Court. We would argue the 
13 things we've already included in our memorandum without 
14 repeating them, as far as the persuasive authority of 76-8-309, 
15 sub 7(a), and Black's Law definition of confinement. 
16 But, your Honor, barring any questions of the Court, 
17 that will be my argument. 
18 THE COURT: All right. 
19 MR. EDWARDS: Do you have any questions? 
20 THE COURT: No. 
21 MR. EDWARDS: Thank you. 
22 THE COURT: Any reply? 
23 MR. OLIVER: No, Your Honor - well, just very briefly. 
24 I think that just referring to 76-1-106, I think indeed that's 
25 correct, but there is statutory construction, and one can taLk 
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1 about statutory construction. And I'm trying to remember the 
2 name of the case. It states that we like to go with plain 
3 meaning, ejusdem generis is that which helps us to do that, and 
4 what ejusdem generis means, your Honor — and I recognize, 
5 because the Court said previously that it's familiar with the 
6 doctrine, I'm not going to belabor that — is that the specific 
7 defines the general. 
8 So when we have specific wordings in a statute, and 
9 then a general word, that general word is defined in connection 
10 with the context of the specific, and that's what we have in 
11 this particular case, under 76-8-418, that enumerates specific 
12 — and for general reference, I'm just going to call it real 
13 property locations, and it starts off and it names that, and 
14 then goes to the general. And the reason it goes to the 
15 general is because there's other places that the person can be 
16 confined other than just specifically a ;jail. And it says 
17 here — 
18 THE COURT: Well, what are those places? 
19 MR. OLIVER: Well, you could have a halfway house. 
20 You could have a rehab center that you're sentenced to as a 
21 result of something. It could be the jail - or excuse me, it 
22 could be the prison. It could be — as a matter of fact, I'm 
23 not sure that this would be applicable, but even under home 
24 confinement that may be something that is applicable if indeed 
25 it's done with maliciousness and because of confinement. 
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1 I imagine under the definition that that indeed could 
2 happen, but that's what is defined and shown in the other 
3 juvenile proceedings, because in there — in the juvenile 
4 provisions - excuse me. There they expand a little bit, and 
5 they give you some examples of some, and that's where the 
6 juvenile statutes are instructive specifically to this case 
7 because it says — I'll just read one. It says: 
8 "A child who willfully and intentionally 
9 damages a jail or other place of confinement is 
10 provided in 76-8-14, including a detention 
11 shelter or secure confinement facility operated 
12 by the Division of Youth Corrections." 
13 So there it gives three additional places, and it 
14 does that in several other places of the juvenile court - in 
15 the juvenile proceedings. One of the things that it talks — 
16 well, so there are other places that the judicial system can 
17 place people under sentence that this is intended to cover, and 
18 not just the jail, but other places pursuant to sentence that 
19 the court has the right to place a person in. 
20 And what they're saying is, as long as you're here 
21 under the court's auspices, don't damage it, and that's what 
22 they're talking about. And it doesn't make any difference what 
23 facility it is as long as it's a place of confinement or 
24 [unintelligible]. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
10 
1 Okay, I have reviewed through these memoranda before 
2 the argument, as I mentioned. I've also listened to the 
3 argument of counsel, and I believe that what was (inaudible) is 
4 accurate. This is a matter — I mean this issue is a matter of 
5 law, and secondly, that it's really a question of first 
6 impression. We don't have any case law in the state of Utah 
7 that has interpreted this beyond or to these circumstances that 
8 are in this case. 
9 However, having said that, so that whatever I do 
10 could be basically appealed, saying that it's a matter of law. 
11 There's not any discretionary review; it's a question of 
12 whether it's right or wrong. It's really, I believe, for the 
13 appellate courts to let us know if it's right or wrong. I did 
14 my best judgment, but then only the appellate courts can really 
15 say for the state whether that's accurate and states the law. 
16 But based upon the cases that I've read prior to 
17 this, the statutes that have been shown to me, I'm going to 
18 deny the motion to quash the bind-over and deny the motion to 
19 dismiss the felony count. I do this basically for the reasons 
20 that the word confinement I see goes beyond just a physical 
21 building, and where a person is confined to mean a place of 
22 confinement. 
23 So in light of that ruling, I mean that's something 
24 that could be clearly appealed in the future if that's wrong, 
25 but that's my best judgment. So in light of that, I think we 
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1 need to set this matter for a pretrial, or if you want to 
2 discuss pretrial issues today, whatever you wish tc do. 
3 MR. OLIVER: Your Honor, I think that we would ask -
4 and I have not had the opportunity to discuss with 
5 Ms. Burgess-Beynon what I'm about to say, and so I'm asking in 
6 a general broad - in a general context without specific desire 
7 one way or another. But it might be well in this particular 
8 case, and the Court may well do that, if we took an interloc on 
9 it. And so if we could set, say, a pretrial out a month, give 
10 Ms. Burgess-Beynon the opportunity — which I think we have to 
11 do the interlocutory within two weeks, but I'm sure. There's a 
12 deadline on the interloc. So it's not an open-ended thing that 
13 goes on forever. I think we have to do it, and there has to be 
14 an order prepared, and then we have to do the request for an 
15 interloc within a period of time. 
16 So I would just ask that we set it out, maybe the 
17 same day as Mr. Oliver's. 
18 THE COURT: Did you have any objection to that? 
19 MR. EDWARDS: I mean the other option is to do a plea 
20 agreement conditioned on your right to appeal (inaudible) 
21 decide which strategically (inaudible). 
22 MR. OLIVER: But if we filed an interloc, there may 
23 be a period of time before the court accepts it, but we'll 
24 definitely know by then whether or not an interloc is going to 
25 be filed, what the direction we want to take if -- and it ma/ be 
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1 that we may do a [unintelligible] plea. I mean that may be a 
2 possibility, but don't know at this point in time. I've not 
3 discussed those options with Ms. Burgess-Beynon. So if we 
4 could schedule this for the same day as Mr. Oliver, at least 
5 we'd know — 
6 THE COURT: Is there any objection to that? 
7 MR. EDWARDS: I don't have any. 
8 THE COURT: Then we'll set this for September 5th at 
9 1:00 p.m. for a pretrial, and then you do whatever you're going 
10 to do before then, whether you're going to appeal it at this 
11 point or appeal it on a plea that would condition your plea to 
12 your rights to the appeal. 
13 MR. OLIVER: Okay. I think one of the reasons why 
14 I'm at least thinking interloc is because it is dispositive 
15 question. 
16 THE COURT: As to that count. 
17 MR. OLIVER: Yeah. Well, that's the major count. 
18 THE COURT: Right. 
19 MR. OLIVER: And the Court of Appeals will oftentimes 
20 take a case on interloc if indeed it is dispositive. And if 
21 it's a crucial thing — I mean if we do the trial and then we do 
22 the appeal, or something like that, it's a waste of time. 
23 THE COURT: Yeah. I don't have any problem with 
24 somebody resolving the issue prior to us going to trial. 
25 Whichever way you want to do it, but if that's what you want to 
13 
1 do, then go ahead and do that. Okay, thank you. 
2 MR. OLIVER: Thank you, your Honor. 
3 (Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.) 
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